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LAW, CULTURE, AND THE MORALITY OF JUDICIAL
CHOICE
KENNETH B. NUNN*
Professor Carter has presented us with an interesting and
provocative talk this afternoon.' I think we can all see that he is
a very capable historian, one whose stellar academic reputation
is very richly deserved. I, for my part, am not a historian, but
nonetheless, it seems to me that there are two kinds of history.
We can have a "living history"-a history that is with us, that in-
forms our lives, that tells us what we ought to do today; or we
can have a "dead history"-one that is over and no longer mat-
ters and has no real significance. I will give you an example of
both of these forms of history, which are often contradictory,
and can exist at the same time.
As Professor Berg told you in my introduction, I am visiting
at the Washington and Lee School of Law this semester. Some
of you may know that the "Lee" in Washington and Lee refers to
Confederate General Robert E. Lee, and that he is buried there
in a nice, resplendent tomb. As a matter of fact, his horse is bur-
ied there, too. Washington and Lee is a fine university. It has a
beautiful campus and it is in a very nice town. The people at
Washington and Lee are quite nice, too. They seem dignified
and honorable, yet it is evident that they respect Robert E. Lee a
great deal.
Well, when I found out I was going to Washington and Lee,
I wanted to figure out my schedule so I could know when to re-
turn to Gainesville, Florida to see my family. Specifically, I
wanted to know if they celebrated any Monday holidays so I
could count on a three-day weekend. Now, the first Monday
holiday on my calendar was Martin Luther King's birthday. So, I
innocently asked, "Of course, you observe Martin Luther King's
* Visiting Professor of Law, Washington and Lee School of Law; Professor of
Law, University of Florida College of Law. A.B., Stanford University, 1980; J.D.,
University of California, Berkeley Schoolof Law (Boalt Hall), 1984. I would like
to thank Dean Barry Currier for his kind invitation to participate in the 1998
Rushton Lecture Program and for all his assistance in making my visit to Birming-
ham possible. I would also like to thank Marilyn Currier, Virginia Loftin, Thomas
Berg, and William Ross for their gracious hospitality and support.
' See Dan T. Carter, "Let Justice Be Done": Public Passion and Judicial Courage in
Modem Alabama, 28 CuMB. L. REV. 553 (1998).
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birthday, don't you?" And they replied, "Of course not! We do
not celebrate Martin Luther King's birthday here."
I don't know if any of you know anything about the history
of Virginia, but they weren't too keen on recognizing any civil
rights activist before they recognized the "sons of 01' Virginia."
So they established a new holiday-Jackson-King-Lee Day-to
recognize Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson on the day set
aside to honor Martin Luther King, Jr. That way, those who
wanted to celebrate Martin Luther King's birthday would have
to celebrate these other people, too.
In any event, Jackson-King-Lee Day was not an official holi-
day and the University did not recognize it, so I prepared to stay
in Lexington and work. A week before Martin Luther King's
birthday arrived, a strange thing happened. I was told there was
going to be a change in class schedule. It seems the University
was planning a convocation where they were going to talk about
Robert E. Lee and what a great man he was. Now, they were not
going to require all students to attend the convocation, but they
wanted to make sure all had the opportunity to go, if they so de-
sired. So, we had to change our class schedules. You have to
understand that although this convocation was an official school
program, there was not going to be any official effort to com-
memorate the life of Martin Luther King, Jr.
Initially, I was upset. First, they had told me there was not
going to be a holiday for Martin Luther King, Jr.; then, they ex-
pected me to change my class schedule so they could honor
Robert E. Lee. Ultimately, though, being the accommodationist
that I am, I decided not to disrupt their plans. Instead, I de-
cided to take a holiday. I canceled class and I told my students,
' You all can celebrate whatever you want to celebrate; I'm going
to celebrate Martin Luther King's birthday."
What is interesting about this little incident is that, in the
succeeding days and weeks, a number of these nice, clean-cut,
intelligent, white, middle-class, conservative, Washington and
Lee students came to talk to me. They wanted to make sure that
I was comfortable with the way things had turned out. More
importantly, they wanted to let me know they were decent hu-
man beings, and not Kiansmen, or racists, or irresponsible peo-
ple. People in Virginia, perhaps wrongly, have been celebrating
Robert E. Lee's life for over a century. And it never occurred to
them to worry what Black folks thought about it. So, some
things have changed in a generation. As a Northerner who has
2 See Leah Y. Latimer, Hybrid Holiday Poses Problems for Celebrants, WASH. POST,
Jan. 19, 1987, at B1.
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spent my entire academic life in the South, it often strikes me
how much things have changed. I am pleased to see that there
are people of African descent, such as myself, in this room. We
all know that when this building was built, however, Blacks
could not come in here to attend a program such as this. At that
time, there was no expectation that we would ever come in this
building, other than as maids and janitors. So, of course, a lot
has changed in the South.
One of the most significant changes that has occurred in
the South is that today it is important not to be perceived as a
racist. A generation ago it was important to be a racist-and as
a matter of fact, it was required that you be a racist if you were in-
terested in public life. Today in public life, it is important to be
viewed as a someone who does not have any problems with the
color of a person's skin.3
This is a transformation that is both profound and superfi-
cial. It is profound because it is not often that you see social
practices, that have existed for five hundred years, change in a
span of a lifetime. This is very significant, and I think that we
still do not fully appreciate the work of those, both Black and
white, who struggled over the years in the civil rights movement
to accomplish this.
Yet, while profound, this transformation is also superficial.
It is superficial because my students at Washington and Lee, and
I think many in our society, mistakenly believe that the changes
that have occurred over the past forty years or so render race a
factor of limited significance in our society.4 They believe that
the desire to latch on to the history, memory, and tradition that
is centered around Robert E. Lee can be encouraged without
implicating race at all. They think there is nothing troubling in
honoring Robert E. Lee, who as a general risked his very life for
the continued existence of slavery, and for a society that held
people in bondage. They think this is a history that we need not
connect to race and the complications that race creates in our
society today. Perhaps it is true, and perhaps we need to ac-
knowledge, that Robert E. Lee was a good leader of the Confed-
erate troops, and a capable university president. But we also
need to acknowledge what the Confederacy stood for, what val-
ues Robert E. Lee fought for, and how those values impact and
3 See JOE R. FEAGIN & HERNAN VERA, WHrTE RAcism 142-43 (1995) (describing
how whites seek to avoid the appearance of overt racism, although racist senti-
ments are widespread).
See id. at 137-38 (asserting that most whites do not believe racial discrimination




My students at Washington and Lee wanted to honor Lee
without regard for the cultural meaning of their acts, without
reflecting upon how their behavior furthered or retarded race
relations, without a willingness to tell the whole story. When we
honor Robert E. Lee in this unreflective way, it is an example of
the treatment of history as dead history. It is done; it is over; it
is past. It has no relevance to today. At the same time, this
honoring of Robert E. Lee can be seen as living history, a history
that speaks volumes about our past and about the present state
of race relations in Virginia and throughout the nation.
The most significant thing about Professor Carter's speech
is that it addresses the role that culture plays in developing and
forming the law.6 This is something that is a central part of my
work as a scholar. What we are talking about here, in reference
to Professor Carter's talk, is the role that white power played in
racial oppression in the thirties and forties.
Racial oppression in the South was not merely the conse-
quence of statutes, or laws on the books, that said Blacks could
not ride the bus, or serve on juries, or buy property, or testify
against whites. Nor was it the fact that those statutes were en-
forced by clearly racist police officers, swinging clubs and direct-
ing vicious dogs, that made the American South the oppressive
community that it was.
Quite often, it was social pressure. It was the desire to con-
form, the desire to fit in, that made the South such a hellish
place, not only for Blacks, but for whites who wanted to follow
the dictates of their consciences. So, we see that we can have a
dictatorship without dictators, and we can have lawlessness in
the presence of the law. We do not need to have a formal and
8
obvious means of state repression for subjugation to take place.
" See Malcolm Suber, White Supremacy Thinking Still Exists, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Jan. 13, 1998, at B6 Letter to the Editor, for a good presentation of the
argument that honoring Robert E. Lee glorifies white supremacy, slavery, and the
oppression of African Americans.
6 See Carter, supra note 1, 557-58.
See Kenneth B. Nunn, Trial as Text: Allegory, Myth and Symbol in the Adversarial
Criminal Process-A Critique of the Role of the Public Defender and a Proposal for Reform,
32 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 743 (1995) (arguing culture shapes view of crime, the crimi-
nal law, and the criminal justice system) [hereinafter Nunn, Trial as Text]; Ken-
neth B. Nunn, Illegal Aliens: Extraterrestrials and White Fear, 48 FLA. L. REv. 397(1996) (describing cultural studies and applying methodology of cultural studies
to race relations law); Kenneth B. Nunn, Law as a Eurocentric Enterprise, 15 LAw &
INEQ. J. 323 (1997) (arguing nature of law is determined by attributes of Euro-
pean culture).8 See Nunn, Trial as Text, supra note 7, at 764 (stating hegemony not imposed by
power of state but by cultural consensus); Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Re-
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It took courage to be a Judge Horton.9 It took courage to
be a Judge Vance. It took courage to be a Judge Johnson 10 in
the South, because of this powerful need to conform, this pow-
erful need to be one of the community, to find a place and a
home in that community. It is what my wife and I often refer to
as the desire to "eat lunch." You want to eat lunch in your
community. You want to be accepted. You want people to like
you. You want them to respect you. And this desire shapes our
conduct in ways that preserve and extend the values of our cho-
sen community.
Consequently, we should not just focus our efforts to inter-
pret the law on those transformations that take place in the law
as it is written on the books. We must also focus on those trans-
formations that take place in the culture and in the society."
They are inseparable, law and opinion. Law is an extension of
our culture and of our society. Although law may be a formality,
it is not a "mere formality."12 It is a formality that influences the
development of our culture.
So, that having been said, what is the meaning of the
Scottsboro Boys' case today? Does it have any influence on our
way of life, the structure of our laws, and the decisions of our
courts? I think it does. Of course, we can see the easy similari-
ties between the Scottsboro Boys' case and the OJ. Simpson'3
case. This is not to say that OJ. Simpson was a person who wasfalsely accused, and that there was no evidence to suggest that
form and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1359-60 (1988) (showing how African Americans can be
oppressed by the hegemonic consensus of the white majority).
9See Carter, supra note 1, at 558-62.
'0 See id. at 566-68.
" See Barbara Yngvesson, Inventing Law in Local Settings: Rethinking Popular Legal
Culture, 98 YALE L.J. 1689, 1690 (1989) (describing a view of "the production of
law as an ongoing process, dialectically linked to the production of community,
which is both a vehicle for and an outcome of the invention of law").
" See Paul Campos, That Obscure Object of Desire: Hermeneutics and the Autonomous
Legal Text, 77 MINN. L. REv. 1065, 1091 (1993) (arguing that legal texts, though
formal, must be interpreted in their "extrinsic" context); Bruce J. Winick, The Ju-
risprudence of TherapeuticJurisprudence, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y. & L. 184, 186 (1997)
("Law is not an artifact on display in a museum, it is a living, breathing, organ-
ism.").
" Both of these cases involved sexual assaults by Black men on white women. In
the Scottsboro Boys case, the alleged crime was a rape. In the O.J. Simpson case,
it was a sexually motivated murder. Both cases were enormous spectacles, in large
part because they both implicated historically taboo interracial sexual relation-
ships. See generally Cheryl I. Harris, Myths of Race and Gender in the Trials of O.J.
Simpson and Susan Smith-Spectacles of Our Times, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 225 (1996)
(discussing symbolism of Simpson and Smith trials); JAMES E. GOODMAN, STORIES




he was involved in the case, and that people of good conscience
did not have reason to believe he was indeed guilty. My inquiry
focuses on the interaction of sex and race and the particularly
strong passions and emotions this combination develops. Re-
gardless of one's opinion about the outcome of the Simpson
case, one cannot say these factors were not present. The pres-
ence of these factors, and the way they were articulated and
played out in the media, can be traced directly to a social pat-
tern that was present in the Scottsboro Boys' case as well.'5
Clearly this is evidence of the interaction of law and culture
at work today. We saw this process of cultural transformation at
work when we saw one of OJ. Simpson's defense attorneys "sell
out," to put it lightly. At the end of the case he wrote a book
and said "I didn't have anything to do with the defense strategy
in this case. I only did it because I was forced to.' 16 This attor-
ney wanted to eat lunch. We understand this. But we also see
the role of social intervention in the law when we consider some
of the fallout of the O.J. Simpson case. When we hear talk that
reflects a public attitude that criminal cases are not tried fast
enough, that people are not put to death fast enough, that
there is no finality in criminal cases, that we have given too
much to criminal defendants, 17 this is evidence of the influence
of culture on the law.' s
" Professor Harris argues these passions are based on the acceptance of funda-
mental myths about the "bestial and brutish nature of Black men" and "the inher-
ent tragedy of interracial relationships." Harris, supra note 13, at 242. According
to Harris, these myths "came into being and are reproduced as social categories
under regimes designed to create and preserve white power." Id. at 234.
15 The origin of this pattern may be traced to the institution of American slavery.
"Exclusive control over sexual access to white women was a central organizing
principle of white supremacy grounded in slavery." Id. at 236. The mythology
and social practices which developed around this principle were used to justify
the use of violence and terror to preserve white supremacy. See id. at 244. Thus,
the subjugation of the Black community was assured through the mythic treat-
ment of race and sex.
16 Robert Shapiro, Simpson's initial attorney and the person who assembled the
so-called "dream team," published a book on his role in the trial in 1996. See
ROBERT L. SHAPIRO & LARIUN WARREN, THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE: A DEFENSE
ATTORNEY'S BRIEF ON THE O.J. SIMPSON TRIAL (1996). According to one reviewer,
Shapiro "seems to have written this book in no small measure to convince read-
ers--dare I say white readers in particular-that controversial defense tactics were
not his idea and that someone else deserves the blame." Henry Weinstein,
Shapiro's Rehash of Trial Reads Like Defense of His Image, ATANTAJ. & CONST., Apr.
28, 1996, at L14. I paraphrase Shapiro's comments here.
17 See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIM'S RIGHTS IN
CRIMINAL TRLus (1995) (arguing for these and other "victim oriented" reforms in
the criminal justice system).
's There is significant evidence that draconian proposals in criminal law are
driven by racial attitudes. See Nunn, Trial as Text, supra note 7, at 775-80
(describing connection between racial attitudes and perceptions of crime and as-
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We can have laws on the books that say you need to have a
speedy trial or a right to counsel. But then, at the same time, we
can have a public arena that makes it difficult for a legislature to
pay attorneys a rate higher than minimum wage to handle com-
plicated death penalty cases. In these cases, your rights to a
speedy trial and competent counsel go right out the window.19
So, to understand the actual functioning of the law, we must
take cultural influences into account.
Professor Carter said we should not impugn Supreme Court
decisions by assuming the bad faith of the Justices of the Su-
preme Court. I cannot heed this warning. I think many of the
decisions of the Supreme Court are in bad faith. It is difficult
for me to see how the Court could not be aware of the reaction-
ary nature of many of its recent decisions in the areas of crimi-
nal justice and race. It is hard to think that the Court acted in
anything but bad faith when it ignored the segregationist history
of the "Capital of the Confederacy" to strike down the Rich-
mond, Virginia city council's minority set-aside plan in Richmond
v. Croson. Nor can the charge of bad faith be avoided when one
considers the Court's opinions in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Penal' and Whren v. United States,22 decisions that greatly, and
serting this linkage helps produce repressive social policies); see also DORIS A.
GRABER, CRamE NEws AND THE PuBLIc 55 (1980) (reporting respondents of 1977
survey viewed crime largely as the work of young males from communities of
color). The Simpson trial, then, is only one particularly nasty example of this
phenomenon.
,9 See Bruce A. Green, Legal Fiction: The Meaning of Counsel in the Sixth Amendment,
78 IowA L. REv. 433 (1993) (claiming that in light of practical realities, right to
counsel is illusory).
20 488 U.S. 469 (1989). In Croson, the efforts of a Black majority city council to
correct longstanding racial inequities in the local construction trade was dis-
missed as divisive racial politics by a plurality of Justices. The decision in Croson
has been sharply criticized by affirmative action advocates. See, e.g., id. (Marshall,
J., dissenting); Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEx. L. REv. 381 (1989).
2' 515 U.S. 200 (1995). In Adarand, the Supreme Court overturned at least fif-
teen years of constitutional jurisprudence and applied the strict scrutiny standard
of review to all constitutional challenges of race-based governmental programs.
See Margaret A. Sewell, Adarand Constructors v. Pena: The Armageddon of Affirma-
tive Action, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 611, 614-22 (1997). This ruling endangers all af-
firmative action programs, because, as Gerald Gunther's oft-quoted maxim points
out, "strict scrutiny is strict in theory, but fatal in fact." Gerald Gunther, The Su-
preme Court 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of an Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972). For case
comments critical of the Adarand decision, see Sewell, supra, Michael L. Manuel,
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena: Is Strict Scrutiny Fatal in Fact for Governmental
Affirmative Action Programs?, 31 NEw ENG. L. REV. 975 (1997); Bryant S. Delgadillo,
Recent Development, 69 TEMPL L. REV. 1521 (1996); Sameer M. Ashar and Lisa
F. Opoku, Recent Development, 31 HARvARD C.R. - C.L. L. REV. 223 (1996).
517 U.S. 806 (1996) (holding pretextual traffic stops are not violative of
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures). The
1998]
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predictably, harmed the ability of communities of color to sur-
vive and prosper in this nation.
One may be able to defend these decisions on a cold, hard
balance sheet, that looks to the decision only as a matter of law.
But we know these decisions have a cultural influence. We
know they embolden people who are opposed to racial equality
and racial justice. If we do not know that ourselves, all we need
to do is pick up the newspapers and read the arguments made
by such people. Take McCleskey v. Kemp,2s in which the court
said that the demonstrated disparity in the rate that African
Americans are put to death in Georgia required no remedy, be-
cause it was important to preserve the discretion of prosecutors,
the very discretion they were using to discriminate against
Blacks. Can that opinion stand for anything other than a bald
endorsement of the claim that Black lives are worth less than
white lives?
Or, what can we say when we have case like United States v.
Armstrong,24 which dealt with the standard used to allow discov-
ery in discriminatory prosecution cases? In that case, the Court
set a standard of proof so high it is virtually impossible to meet
at trial, let alone in the pretrial stages of a case.25 A decision
such as this says that the Supreme Court doesn't like discrimina-
tory prosecution cases, and would rather be rid of them. By
making it so difficult to allege racial discrimination in criminal
cases, the Supreme Court has given prosecutors the green light
to treat members of minority communities any way they want to.
These are all horrendous decisions. They are decisions that
are transparently racist and that a Supreme Court committed to
providing justice for all American citizens would never render.
Decisions such as these make it difficult to for us to say that the
Supreme Court's decision in Whren permits police departments to stop pedestri-
ans and motorists at will, and allows well-documented and widespread discrimina-
tory detentions of people of color to continue unchecked. See Angela J. Davis,
Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425 (1997).
481 U.S. 279 (1987).
24 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
" In order to obtain discovery in selective prosecution cases, litigants must show
both a discriminatory effect and a discriminatory purpose. Id. at 468-70. To show
a discriminatory purpose, Armstrong requires litigants to demonstrate that similarly
situated individuals could have been prosecuted, but were not. Id. at 465. This is
a difficult showing under most circumstances, but one that is extremely unlikely
to be met prior to any discovery. See Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 337 n.22 (1998) (describing Armstrong's evidentiary
burden as "heavy" and "strict"); Marc Michael, United States v. Armstrong: Selective
Prosecution-A Futile Defense and Its Arduous Standard of Discovery, 47 CATH. U.L.
REV. 675, 717 (1998) (describing the selective prosecution defense in light of Arm-
strong as "an illusory opportunity to defeat criminal charges open to those with
good fortune to discover the necessary 'similarly situated' evidence").
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progress that many of us would like to see has come very far at
all. We deserve a better Supreme Court than this. We deserve a
better judiciary than this. Judge Horton and others have set the
example. Why are ourjudges and justices not following it?
We should recognize, as a community, that we all play a role
in choosing the direction in which our law proceeds. It is nice,
and I think just, for us to acknowledge the strength of character
that strong judges have shown when faced with a moment of cri-
sis and of conscience. I think it is important for us to do that.
But we cannot simply rely on strong mavericks to stand for what
is just. We have to play our role in creating those people, be-
cause they are created.
Toward the end of his lecture, Professor Carter described
how meaningful it was forJudge Horton to do "the right thing,"
because of his concern for his children and his grandchildren.6
The centrality of family in Judge Horton's explanation of his
ruling tells us that it was family--his father, his mother, and his
grandparents-that instilled those values in him. This was what
made him the kind of man he was, so that he did not care
whether he could "eat lunch" in his small Alabama town any-
more. It is important for us to continue that tradition, and to
continue to create judges that are independent and incorrupti-
ble. We must support our judges when they make tough deci-
sions that are unpopular, but right. But we must also help them
develop the moral sense, and the strength of character, to make
them in the first place.
' Carter, supra note 1, at 560-61.
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